Comments

TEACHING TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION IN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: DEFINING RELIGION
FOR ESTABLISHMENT PURPOSES

In Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi a United States district
court held that public school instructionin TranscendentalMeditation violates the establishment of religion clause of the first
amendment. The Malnak courtfound TranscendentalMeditation
to be a religion although its proponents asserted the technique is
scientifically based and non-religious. Malnak raises questions
as to how religion should be properly defined when interpreting
the establishment clause. This Comment analyzes the Malnak decision and discusses recent efforts by the judiciary to delineate a
legal definition of religion. It concludes that a broad definition of
religion is necessary to effectuate the underlying values of the
first amendment.
In recent years courses offering instruction in the technique of
Transcendental Meditation (TM) and its theoretical component,
the Science of Creative Intelligence (SCI),' have become popular
in public schools throughout the nation. 2 However, the propriety
of such instruction has recently been challenged on constitutional
1. The full course will hereinafter be referred to as TM/SCI.
2. Courses have been introduced in the secondary schools of a number of
states, including California, New York, and New Jersey. See Doerr, Transcendental Meditation Goes to School, 40 EDuc. DIG. 44 (1975); Driscoll, TM as a Secondary
School Subject, 54 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 236 (1972); Rubottom, TranscendentalMeditation and Its Potential Usesfor Public Schools, 36 Soc. EDUC. 851 (1972). Institution of the classes has been aided by a $21,500 grant from the National Institute of
Mental Health enabling 150 high school teachers to be trained as TM/SCI instructors. Haddon, New Plant Thrives in a SpiritualDesert, CHPasTANn TODAY, Dec.
21, 1973, at 9.
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grounds in Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. 3 There a New
Jersey United States district court enjoined the teaching of
TM/SCI in courses at five New Jersey secondary schools. The
court reasoned that employment of TM/SCI in the educational
curriculum constitutes an establishment of religion, prohibited by
4
the first amendment to the United States Constitution.
Malnak is the first decision in which a court has determined
that a belief or practice is "religious" within the scope of the establishment clause despite contrary claims by its proponents. 5 In
prior cases, public school activities enjoined by the courts as an
abridgement of the establishment clause were agreed by all parties involved to be religious in nature. The only issue was
whether government support of the practices comprised an unconstitutional establishment of religion.6
The Malnak court had the opportunity to fashion a novel rule of
law. The court could have set forth criteria to define the religiousness of a system of beliefs or practices pursuant to the establishment clause of the United States Constitution. However, the
Malnak court's failure to do so is indicative of the confused line
of decisions by the courts during the last two decades dealing
with the proper applicable legal definition of religion under both
the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment.
This Comment will discuss the implementation of TM/SCI
courses in public schools and the subsequent decision in Malnak.
The Comment will then analyze prior efforts by the judiciary to
elucidate a constitutional definition of religion. Finally, the Comment will attempt to develop a framework by which to determine
whether given beliefs or practices can be classified as "religious"
for establishment clause purposes. The framework is both pragmatic and workable and attempts to effectuate the underlying values served by the establishment clause.
3. 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977).
4. The religion clauses of the first amendment state: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. L
5. TM proponents have argued that TM/SCI is essentially non-religious in
nature. However, they experience difficulty in deciding whether it is a philosophy
or science or should be classified under some other nomenclature. Malnak v.
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1297 (D.N.J. 1977). See also J. FOREM,
TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATON 205 (1973) (definition of SCI); Rubottom, Transcendental Meditation and Its PotentialUsesfor Public Schools, 36 Soc. EDUC.851, 853
(1972).
6. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (devotional
Bible reading enjoined in morning classroom exercises); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (nondenominational prayer in the classroom prohibited).
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MALNAK V. MAHARISHI MAHESH YOGI-THE NEW JERSEY PROGRAM

TM/SCI 7 was offered as an elective course at five New Jersey
secondary schools during the 1975-1976 academic .year.B The
7. TM is a simple meditation technique engaged in by the practitioner from
15-20 minutes, twice per day. During meditation, the individual sits i{ d relaxed
position and silently repeats a Sanskrit (the ancient language used in the sacred
literature of the Hindu religion) syllable called a "mantra." This repetition purportedly causes the meditator to enter a new state of consciousness known as
"restful alertness," marked by decreased oxygen consumption and respiration
rates. See Wallace &Benson, The Physiology of Meditation, Sci. Am., Feb., 1972, at
84 (pioneering study of the physiological effects of TM).
Currently, the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi is attempting to implement a World Plan
by which one teacher of TM/SCI will be trained for every 1,000 persons in the
world's populace. The World Plan has seven goals:
(1) To develop the full potential of the individual;
(2) To improve governmental achievements;
(3) To realize the highest ideal of education;
(4) To eliminate the age-old problem of crime and all behavior that
brings unhappiness to the family of man;
(5) To maximize the intelligent use of the environment
(6) To bring fulfillment to the economic aspirations of individuals and
society;
(7) To achieve the spiritual goals of mankind in this generation.
Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D.N.J. 1977); MAHARIsHI
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROGRESS

2 (1975).

The Science of Creative Intelligence, like TM, was primarily devised and
promulgated by the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. SCI attempts to explain the causes
of the physiological and psychological changes undergone during meditation. According to the theory, while in the meditation state the individual is able to reverse the process by which thought develops from the subconscious to the
conscious mind and thereby contact its source, an entity entitled the "field of pure
creative intelligence." Rubottom, Transcendental Meditation and Its Potential
Uses for Public Schools, 36 Soc. EDUc. 851, 853 (1972). This entity is considered
the ultimate source of all life. Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at
1292. Moreover, SCI teaches that when the field of pure creative intelligence is
reached, the meditator is able to tap its vast and unlimited powers. Prolonged
practice of the technique will supposedly infuse the meditator with all the beneficial qualities of creative intelligence, including greater happiness and expanded
awareness, creativity, intelligence, and energy. When the practitioner is able to
experience each aspect of creative intelligence, not only during meditation but
throughout the walking, sleeping, and dreaming states, he is considered to be selfrealized in a new state of consciousness, "cosmic consciousness." Id. at 1289-90.
8. Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1289. A comprehensive
syllabus for the introduction of TM/SCI into the educational curriculum was developed by the Maharishi in 1972. Rubottom, TranscendentalMeditation and Its
PotentialUsesfor Public Schools, 36 Soc. EDUC. 851, 852 (1972). It is claimed that
the courses offer an integrated, interdisciplinary, and holistic approach to learning
now lacking in the educational system. Id. at 854-57. Educators, in particular,
have been impressed by claims that TM will decrease student drug abuse, raise
scholastic averages, and improve student-teacher relationships. Driscoll, TM as a
Secondary School Subject, 54 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 236 (1972) (quote from New York

teachers, none of whom were regular employees of the school system, were trained and paid by the World Plan Executive Council-United States (WPEC-US).9 Classes met for one hour, five
days per week, and were divided into two segments. Fifteen to
twenty minutes of each session were devoted to the practice of
TM. The remainder of the hour was used for instruction in the
Science of Creative Intelligence.10 Class instruction was aided by
the use of a textbook entitled Science of Creative Intelligencefor
Secondary Education: First-Year Course." In addition, pupils attended a special mandatory initiation ceremony held off campus. 12
Twelve plaintiffs filed suit in United States district court to enjoin further teaching of TM/SCI on the ground the instruction violated the establishment clause. Twenty defendants were named
in the action.13 Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was
granted and a permanent injunction was issued.14 The court held
that educational instruction in TM/SCI constitutes state support
of religion prohibited by the first amendment.
The Textbook and Puja
The Malnak court initially examined the characterization of
creative intelligence contained in the course textbook. The court
found the textbook described creative intelligence so as to equate
State Superintendent of Schools). See also Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440
F. Supp. at 1323-24 (goals of the New Jersey program discussed).
9. The WPEC-US, a nonprofit corporation, is the main organizational vehicle
for propagating TM/SCI in the United States.
10. Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1323.
11. Id. at 1289 n.6.
12. Id. at 1305. The ceremony is called a "puja." Its significance is discussed
in text accompanying notes 22-28 infra.
13. Plaintiffs consisted of eight New Jersey taxpayers, four of whom had children attending a high school at which the course was taught. They comprised an
unincorporated association called the Coalition for Religious Integrity. Other
plaintiffs included a New Jersey clergyman, Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, and Spiritual Counterfeit Project, Inc. Malnak v. Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1287.
Defendants included numerous persons and organizations involved in the propagation of TM/SCI under the aegis of the World Plan Executive Council, the five
boards of education that instituted TM/SCI in the educational curriculum, the
New Jersey Department of Education, the United States Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, and the United States. Id. at 1287-88. The Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi was also named as a defendant, but plaintiffs were unable to effect
personal service on him. Id. at 1288 n.1.
14. The defendants have subsequently filed an appeal. Malnak v. Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), appealdocketed, Nos. 78-1568, 78-1569
(3d Cir. May 11, 1978). Thus, Malnak appears to be only the first round of a legal
battle that may rage for years in the state and federal courts.
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its nature and attributes with those commonly associated with an

Ultimate Reality or Supreme Being.
According to the textbook, creative intelligence is infinite, eter5
nal, and the constituent source of everything in the universe.'
The textbook also ascribed to this entity cosmic intelligence, creating and structuring every aspect of life.16 Moreover, the textbook indicated creative intelligence has the powers of
omnipotence,' 7 omnipresence,18 and omniscience.19
The textbook further stated that the sole purpose of Man and
nature is to become infused with the qualities of creative intelligence and thereby to "gain a state of unlimited energy, intelligence, power, creativity, and bliss."20 The text also asserted that
contacting the field of pure creative intelligence is the exclusive
means by which personal fulfillment can be obtained. Additionally, this could be done only through the practice of TM.21
The Malnak court also examined the religious ceremony present in the initiation puja. Although held off campus, attendance
at the puja was mandatory for students enrolled in the TM/SCI
course. Initiation rites were performed for each student in a
22
small room, the teacher being the only other person present.
The major part of the ceremony consisted of a three- to four-minute Sanskrit chant sung by the teacher. At the chant's close, an
15. Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1292-95.
16. Id. at 1292-93. For example, the textbook stated that creative intelligence
"guides and sustains every aspect of the universe" and that "the activity of nature
is conducted by creative intelligence." Id. at 1292.
The textbook further attributed the evolution of life to creative intelligence:

"The progress and evolutionary qualities of creative intelligence are at the basis of
all growth everywhere; they continually propel life on increasing steps of progress
towards the fulness of life." Id. at 1293 n.11.
17. E.g., "the origin of all power in nature." Id. at 1294.
18. For example, the textbook stated that "creative intelligence is present everywhere, within us as well as without us." Id.
19. For example, creative intelligence was called "the universal basis of all

life." Id.
20. Id. at 1296.
21. Id.
22. The pupils were required to bring to the ceremony a clean white handkerchief, flowers, and a few pieces of fruit. Upon entering the room where the puja
was held, the students removed their shoes, and the handkerchief, flowers, and
fruit were placed on a rectangular table covered by a white cloth. The table also
contained a brass candleholder, brass incense holder, three brass water-filled
dishes, rice, sandalpaste, and a small color photograph of Guru Dev. Guru Dev,
who has been dead for over 20 years, was the teacher and guru of the Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi. TM proponents claim that he perfected the TM technique and
handed it down to the Maharishi. Id. at 1305.

individual mantra was verbally imparted to the student. The English translation of the chant was never revealed to the students,
23
although each teacher possessed a copy.
The Malnak court noted the text of the translation labeled the
chant an "Invocation," commonly defined as the "invoking or calling upon a spirit, a principle, a person, or a deity for aid."24 The

translation also revealed the chant was essentially an expression
of reverence for and worship of certain human and divine personages, including the "Lord" and Guru Dev. 25 Moreover, it clearly

denominated Guru Dev as a personification of the "Lord" and attributed to him divine qualities 26 similar to those ascribed to crea27
tive intelligence.
In sum, the textbook clearly described a type of Ultimate Reality which is eternal, infinite, omnipresent, illimitable, perfect, intelligent, and the basic constituent of everything in the universe.
Therefore, the court concluded that creative intelligence, no matter how denominated in the SCI theory, would be given the name
God in common parlance. 28 Moreover, the puja was clearly an in23. Id. at 1320.
24. Id. at 1309. A flavor of the chant's structure can be gleaned from the following excerptInvocatiQn
Whether pure or impure, where purity or impurity is permeating everywhere, whoever opens himself to the expanded vision of unbounded
awareness gains inner and outer purity.
White as camphor, kindness incarnate, the essence of creation garlanded
with Brahman, ever dwelling in the lotus of my heart, the creative impulse
of cosmic life, to That, in the form of Guru Dev, I bow down. Offering light
to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering water to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering a handful of flowers.
Guru in the glory of Brahma, Guru in the glory of Vishnu, Guru in the
glory of the great Lord Shiva, Guru in the glory of the personified transcendental fulness of Brahman, to Him, to Shri Guru Dev adorned with
glory, I bow down.
The Unbounded, like the endless canopy of the sky, the omnipresent in all
creation, by whom the sign of That has been revealed, to Him, to Shri
Guru Dev, I bow down.
Id. at 1306-07.
25. See note 22 supra.
26. Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1309.
27. For example, such epithets included "the Unbounded," "the omnipresent
in all creation," "the One," "the Eternal," "the Pure," "the Immovable," and "the
true preceptor." Id. at 1308.
28. Id. at 1307, 1308 n.18. The translation also disclosed that the fruit and
flowers brought by the students to the puja were meant to be offered to Guru Dev
as an act of obeisance and worship. Id. at 1308.
The defendants, however, denied the puja was religious in nature. The TM/SCI
proponents asserted the puja was a simple ceremony of gratitude similar to pujas
avowedly used in a secular context in India. The court quickly dismissed this contention. The court seized upon the futility of expressing gratitude to persons who
are deceased unless one believes they possess some sort of spiritual immortality.

[voL 16: 325, 1979]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

vocation of the spirit of Guru Dev, including worship of him as
the incarnation of a divine being.
What Applicable Standard?
After analyzing the features of the TM/SCI course, the Malnak
court faced the difficult task of deciding what legal criteria to use
in determining whether the course constituted a religion for constitutional purposes. This aspect of the case was novel. In no
prior case was it necessary for a court to decide whether a given
belief system or activity offended the establishment clause when

its proponents denied its religiousness.
The defendants urged the court to adopt a constitutional definition of religion which they termed both "substantive and contextual."29 The key criterion of "religiousness" under their definition
would be the group's subjective characterization of its beliefs or
actions as religious or non-religious. 30 This position was rejected
by the Malnak court. The court observed that classification of beliefs or activities as religious, philosophical, or scientific will necessarily vary according to one's personal values and conceptual
framework. Establishing the religious basis of a belief system or
Moreover, the chant did not express a word of gratitude or thanksgiving. Id. at
1309.
29. Id. at 1315-16.
30. The defendants also contended that a narrower definition of religion
should be employed in establishment clause cases than in those involving free exercise. Their distinction was based on the argument that the free exercise clause
necessitates a broad definition of religion to ensure individual liberty. However,
they claimed that the establishment clause, which was not meant to encompass
the "multifarious heterodox beliefs" protected under the free exercise guaranty, is
thus more constricted in scope. Id. at 1316 n.20.
This argument was dismissed by the court. The court found no support for the
position, but quoted approvingly from Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). There, speaking for four members of the Court,
the Justice stated that the word "religion" has the same substantive meaning
under both the free exercise and the establishment clauses:
"Religion" appears only once in the Amendment. But the word governs
two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two meanings,
one narrow to forbid "an establishment" and another, much broader, for
securing "the free exercise thereof." "Thereof ' brings down "religion"
with its entire and exact content, no more and no less, from the first into
the second guaranty, so that Congress and now the states are as broadly
restricted concerning the one as they are regarding the other.
Id. at 32. The courts have not consistently followed Justice Rutledge's position.
They have rather implicitly applied a narrower definition of religion in establishment cases than in those involving free exercise. See text accompanying notes 6374 infra.

activity on the subjective characterization of its proponents
would, in the court's words, "inject a variable into the first amend3
ment test which would preclude a fair and uniform standard." 1
Moreover, the courts would have to determine the religiousness
of identical beliefs and practices solely by means of the classifica32
tion systems of their adherents.
Rather, the Malnak court concluded that a novel legal definition
of religion was not necessary to decide the case. Because a constitutional provision was involved, the judicial formulation of a
precise definition would rob courts in later cases of flexibility in
deciding whether a set of novel or unique beliefs or practices
33
should be subsumed under the aegis of the religion clauses.
The court looked instead to the substantive character of beliefs
and practices found in prior decisions to be religious within the
34
parameters of the first amendment.
The Malnak court then examined recent decisions interpreting
the religion clauses. These decisions indicated that the types of
beliefs and practices held by the courts to be religious for constitutional purposes have undergone marked expansion. 35 The
Malnak court found especially enlightening the Supreme Court's
discussion on the diversity of modern religious expression in
United States v. Seeger.36 Seeger involved the proper meaning of
the phrase 'religious.training and belief' in applying section 6(j)
of the Selective Service Act of 1948,37 which governs conscientious
31. Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1318.
32. Id.

The court, by examining TM/SCI's own history, illustrated the

problems associated with giving sole credence to the characterization given beliefs
or activities by their proponents. For example, the articles of incorporation of the
Spiritual Regeneration Movement (SRM), the first organization to promulgate
TM/SCI in the United States, stated that the corporation was a religious one
whose "educational purpose shall be to give instructions in a simple system of
meditation." Id. at 1319. However, now TM/SCI's proponents claim that TM/SCI
is completely secular.
33. Id. at 1315. See also Weiss, Privilege,Posture and Protection: "Religion" in
the Law, 73 YALE I.J. 593, 604 (1964) (argument raised that any definition of religion would violate the free exercise clause by dictating which forms religions
should take).
34. Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1315. For discussion of
these prior decisions, see note 35 & text accompanying notes 35-39 infra.
35. For example, modern cases have found actions and beliefs to be religious
although not derived from or propagated by traditional religious sects or organizations. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (nondenominational prayer composed by the New York State Board of Regents for use in school exercises held to
offend the establishment clause); Torcaso v. Watkins 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
Courts have also held that a belief in the existence of a Supreme Being is not a
necessary component of religious belief and practice. Id. at 495 n.1l.
36. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
37. Ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1976)).
The Act states in pertinent partNothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person
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objector exemptions. The Seeger Court, especially cognizant of a
recent revolution in the conceptions of God and religion held by
segments of the modern religious community,3 8 adopted a liberal
interpretation of "religious training and belief," holding that
within the scope of section 6(j)
would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based on a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else
is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for
39
the exemption comes within the statutory definition.
to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the
United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and
belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.
Although the Seeger Court was engaged in statutory interpretation, the constraints of the first amendment strongly influenced its decision. The Seeger Court
adopted an expansive definition of "religious training and belief" primarily to save
the statute from constitutional attack on the ground that it ran afoul of the free
exercise clause by discriminating in favor of those holding theistic beliefs against
those adhering to non-theistic faiths. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188
(1965) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A
Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L. REV. 679, 713 (1969); Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Protection:Antiquated Oddity or Vital Reality?, 34 Omo ST. L.J.
15, 20 (1973).
38. The Seeger Court, for example, took notice of the views of the late Protestant theologian, Dr. Paul Tillich, who described God not as a personal Supreme
Being "out there" but in universal terms as the ground of Man's very being. Dr.
Tillich also used a definition of "God" very similar to the test for determining "religious training and belief" adopted by the Court: "And if that word [God] has not
much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the
source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without
any reservation." United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (quoting P. Tn.LICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS

57 (1948) (emphasis original)).

The Malnak court also focused on Justice Douglas's concurring Seeger opinion
where he discussed the need to characterize Hinduism and Buddhism as religions
even though neither posits the existence of a personal God. The Malnak opinion
also clearly indicated that striking similarities exist between the theories developed in SCI and the tenets of the Hindu and Buddhist faiths. 440 F. Supp. at 132122 (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 189-90 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring)). For example, the Hindu concept of Brahman as being 'Truth, Knowledge,
and Bliss" and "the source of the entire universe" corresponded closely with the
course textbook's description of creative intelligence as "an ocean of bliss," "a
field of unlimited happiness," "the home of all knowledge," "the basis of every individual life," and "the source of all existence." Id. at 1322.
39. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).

The Religiousness of TM/SCI
After surveying the foregoing cases, the Malnak court had little
difficulty in finding TM/SCI to be a religion within the scope of
the establishment clause. The TM/SCI course textbook ascribed
to creative intelligence qualities similar to those normally attributed to God or an Ultimate Reality. Moreover, the text stated this
entity can be contacted only through the practice of TM.40 According to Seeger, concepts concerning a Supreme Being or Ultimate Reality are deemed religious when posited in the doctrines
of Secular Humanism, Hinduism, and modern Protestant theology. The court reasoned such concepts could not become less so
when presented as a philosophy4l or science. Under the Seeger
formulation, the SCI theory would thus be held religious for constitutional purposes. Furthermore, the puja ceremony was a type
of religious ritual involving prayer and worship of a deified person.42
Application of the Three-Prong Test
The Malnak court then determined that the TM/SCI courses offered in the five New Jersey secondary schools offended the establishment clause. The Supreme Court has set forth a threeprong test to aid in determining whether specific government involvement with religion contravenes the first amendment. The
test states that to avoid running afoul of the establishment clause,
the government action in question must: (1) reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose; (2) have a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive government
43
entanglement with religion.
The avowedly secular purpose of the TM/SCI courses was to
make available to students the alleged physiological and psychological benefits of the TM technique. 44 However, the Malnak
court held that in effectuating this secular purpose, the government agencies involved were also propagating a religious concept
40. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
41. The court, in a footnote, stated that a philosophy could presuppose the
existence of a Supreme Being or Ultimate Reality without maintaining any organizational structure or house of worship. Yet such a philosophy would still come
under the prohibition of the establishment clause if the government aided in the
inculcation of the philosophy through educational instruction. Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1322 n.23.
42. See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
43. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973). Each of the
three prongs of the Nyquist test must be satisfied to preserve the governmental
action's constitutionality.
44. Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1323. See notes 7-8
supra.
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-that by practicing TM, one could contact a Supreme Being or
Ultimate Reality. Moreover, the mechanics of the TM technique
were taught by means of a religious ceremony at which attendance was mandatory. Thus, the court concluded, the New Jersey
program had a primary effect that advanced religion. 45 Furthermore, the program constituted an excessive government entanglement with religion because both state and federal governments
provided funds enabling the TM/SCI courses to be taught. Therefore, because the TM/SCI courses failed to satisfy the last two
prongs of the three-prong test, the court held them to be in violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MALNAK

Societal conceptions regarding the content of religious belief
and practice have undergone a recent expansion. As a result, a
correlative change has taken place in the judicial demarcation of
actions and beliefs considered "religious" within the parameters
of the first amendment. To further the broad purposes of the free
exercise guaranty, and to avoid discriminating among disparate
belief systems, the courts, in cases like Seeger, have moved toward a broad, expansive definition of religion in free exercise
cases. Consequently, former semantic distinctions between religious tenets and moral, philosophical, political, and scientific
viewpoints have become blurred.
This blurring creates problems when one attempts to define religion in the establishment clause context. For if a broad definition is uniformly applied when establishment is at issue, the
types of governmental activity that might be held "religious" and
therefore unconstitutional would be considerably expanded. Theoretically, expansion could endanger many government programs
based on moral, philosophical, or political judgments by legislatures.
The Malnak court was the first court presented with the opportunity to initiate the judicial formulation of clear criteria by which
to adjudge whether challenged beliefs or practices are "religious"
for establishment clause purposes.4 6 However, rather than formu45. 440 F. Supp. at 1324.
46. Academic comment dealing with the problem of defining religion under
the free exercise clause has been profuse. See Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the
Constitution:A ClassificationProblem, 11 VAt. U.L. REV. 163 (1977); Boyan, Defin-

late such criteria, the Malnak court purposefully avoided what it
considered to be an "unprecedented definition of religion." 47 Instead, the court looked solely to what the Supreme Court has
held to be religious beliefs and practices in dissimilar contexts.
This analysis can be faulted on two grounds. First, because the
court failed to set forth clear standards for legally defining religion, its holding will give little help to future courts grappling
with related establishment claims. Ironically, even though the
Malnak court eschewed the necessity of fashioning a novel definition of religion, the court implicitly adopted the broad Seeger
test.48 Second, the Malnak court's discussion fails to comprehend
the conceptual problems encountered when the broad Seeger
definition of religion is juxtaposed into the establishment context.
These problems are indicated by the courts' implicit use of a narrower definition of religion in interpreting the establishment
clause than in free exercise cases. 49
Instead of looking to judicially characterized religious activity
in unrelated areas, the Malnak court's analysis would have been
more penetrating had it examined TM/SCI's asserted religiousness in relation to the distinct establishment values at stake in
the sphere of public education. Such an approach would have
avoided the pitfalls associated with the broad Seeger definition of
religion but would still effectuate establishment principles. 50 The
difficulties posed when the liberal, all-inclusive Seeger definition
of religion is uniformly applied in both the establishment and the
free exercise areas is illustrated by examining the manner in
which the courts have defined religion under the two clauses.
The Evolution Toward a JudicialDefinition of Religion
Early decisions defined religion as an organized body of believing Religion in Operationaland Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 479 (1968);
Hollingsworth, note 37 supra; Note, Humanistic Values in the PublicSchool Curriculum: Problems in Defining an Appropriate "Wall of Separation,"61 Nw. U.L. Rsv.
795 (1965); Comment, Defining Religion: Of God, The Constitution and the D.A.R.,
32 U. Cm. L. REV. 533 (1965).
However, as the case law on establishment has expanded, the courts have become correspondingly reticent to delineate which types of beliefs and practices
should be deemed religious within the first amendment's scope. For example, one
court has stated that the Supreme Court "appears to have avoided the problem
with studied frequency in recent years." United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439,
443 (D.D.C. 1968).
47. 440 F. Supp. at 1320.
48. The court accomplished this result by accepting the Seeger thesis that any
belief in an Ultimate Reality, whether theistic or non-theistic, qualifies as a religious belief. Id. at 1320-22. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
49. See text accompanying notes 63-74 infra.
50. See text accompanying notes 75-89 infra.
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ers employing religious ceremony and having a faith in and commitment to a supernatural Supreme Being. The first attempt by
the Supreme Court to give content to the constitutional meaning
of religion came in Davis v. Beason.5 1 The Court used a theistic
definition of religion, saying "[t] he term 'religion' has reference to
one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations
they impose of reverence
for his being and character, and of obe52
dience to his will."
The modern trend away from a narrow, theistic definition of religion was initiated in United States v. Kauten.53 The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of conscientious objector status to an
atheist because his objection to military service was based solely
on political grounds. However, in dictum, Judge Augustus Hand,
writing for the court, dismissed the notion that a belief in a
Supreme Being is a necessary element of "religious training and
belief' under the statute. Rather, he contended the proddings of
conscience could also be delimited as religious:
Religious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a
means of relating the individual to his fellow-men and to his universe - a
sense common to men in the most primitive and in the most highly civilized societies. It accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it
[A] conscientious objection to participation in any war ... may
....
justly be regarded as a response of the individual to an inward mentor,
call it conscience or God, that is for many persons at the present54time the
equivalent of what has always been thought a religious impulse.
51. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). Davis involved the criminal prosecution of a member
of the Mormon religion under an Idaho statute disenfranchising persons from voting or holding elected office if they belonged to any organization practicing or advocating bigamy or polygamy. The Court upheld the statute's constitutionality
against a free exercise challenge. It refused to recognize that a belief in bigamy or
polygamy could be a tenet of a bona fide religious faith, saying: "To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of manldnd." Id. at 341-42.
52. Id. at 342. See also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931)
(Hughes, C.J., dissenting): "The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation."
53. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
54. Id. at 708. Contra, Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946). The Bernan court rejected Judge Hand's position that
theism is not a necessary criterion of religion, saying- "[P]hilosophy and morals
and social policy without the concept of deity cannot be said to be religion in the
sense of that term as it is used in the statute." Id. at 381.
See also Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315
P.2d 394 (1957). The case involved the claim of a Humanist organization to a state
constitutional property tax exemption extended to property used "solely and exclusively for religious worship." Noting that Asian religions such as Buddhism,
Taoism, and Confucianism do not adhere to the concept of a supernatural personal
God, the court held that theism was not a prerequisite to qualification for the tax

The Supreme Court subsequently raised the elimination of the-

ism from a legal definition of religion to the constitutional level in
Torcaso v. Watkins.55 In Torcaso, the Court struck down on free

exercise grounds a provision of the Maryland Constitution requiring the declaration of a belief in God as a prerequisite to the holding of public office or the receipt of a state commission. The
appellant, a Secular Humanist, was denied a notary public commission because he refused to make the required declaration.
However, the Supreme Court held the provision invalid because it
discriminated against holders of non-theistic beliefs. 56 The Court
added in a footnote that "[a]mong religions in this country which
do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the
existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular
57
Humanism and others."
The Seeger Definition
The judicial move toward a broad constitutional definition of religion reached its culmination in the Supreme Court's Seeger decision. 5 8 The Court defined religion as a belief "to which all else
is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent"
and which "occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by the God" of orthodox believers.59
The Seeger Court adopted a functional approach to religion, dispensing with theism or a belief in the supernatural. A functional
definition does not examine the content of beliefs but looks to the
psychological role beliefs play in the life of the individual.60
exemption and thus upheld the Humanists' claim. Instead the court proposed an
objective test that would focus on the function beliefs play in the individual's life.
The proposed test was
whether or not the belief occupies the same place in the lives of its holders that the orthodox beliefs occupy in the lives of believing majorities,
and whether a given group that claims the exemption conducts itself the
way groups conceded to be religious conduct themselves. The content of
the belief, under such test, is not a matter of governmental concern.
Id. at 692, 315 P.2d at 406. Accord, Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (property tax exemption for religious organizations granted to a Humanist group).
55. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
56. Id. at 494-95.
57. Id. at 495 n.11.
58. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra. Although the Court's holding
was limited to statutory interpretation, there is good reason to believe that the
broad definition of religious training and belief employed in Seeger may become
the constitutional standard in the free exercise area. See, e.g., Mansfield, Conscientious Objection - 1964 Term, in 1965 RELaGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3, 8-9 (D.
Giannella ed. 1966).
59. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
60. Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U.
PA L. REV. 479, 487 (1968); Hollingsworth, supra note 37, at 78.
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Therefore, according to the Seeger test, a religious belief is one
that functions in a non-theist's life in a manner similar to the way
a belief in God functions in the lives of members of the orthodox
religious majority.
Generally, the faith in God held by orthodox believers serves
the psychological function of answering basic "questions about
the meaning of human existence." 61 Such a belief is a means of
explaining or structuring reality and of providing a standard by
which to evaluate one's actions and behavior. Thus, under a functional definition, religious beliefs are those which the individual
"considers of supreme importance" 62 and which give meaning and
purpose to life. Their relation to a Supreme Being or Transcendent Reality is irrelevant.
Following a subjective, functional approach to defining religion,
the Seeger Court ignored the manifestations of religion in the institutional or organizational sense. 63 A definition using institutional criteria delineates religion in terms of its traditional
forms-a hierarchical organizational structure, houses of worship,
a formal clergy, and ritualistic ceremony.
Categorizing religion by its institutional manifestations enables
one to draw sharp distinctions between the "sacred" and the "secular"; the sacred involving worship, ceremony, and a concern with
and belief in the supernatural, the secular a concern with the
temporal matters of this world. This distinction is eliminated by
the Seeger holding that neither a belief in a Supreme Being nor
membership in a religious institution is an essential component of
religiousness. Rather, by defining religious belief as whatever one
deems to be of supreme or ultimate importance, the Seeger test
61. Mansfield, Conscientious Objection - 1964 Term, in 1965 RELIGION AND THE
PUBLIC ORDER 3, 10 (D. Gianella ed. 1966).
62. Hollingsworth, supra note 37, at 35. According to the Seeger decision, the
judiciary can make only two inquiries in distinguishing whether a belief is religiously based. First, it may determine whether the questioned belief is one of
supreme importance to the individual "upon which all else is ... dependent." 380
U.S. at 176. Second, the courts can inquire whether the belief is "sincerely held"
by its holder. However, judicial examination into the validity or comprehensibility
of the belief is foreclosed. Id. at 185 (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944)).
63. The distinction between functional and institutional definitions is drawn in
Boyan, Defining Religion in Operationaland Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 479 (1968).

makes everyone religious in some sense.64 Thus, the Seeger test
creates difficulties in distinguishing between religious and nonreligious beliefs and activities.
The Establishment Paradox
Significantly, the Seeger functional definition of religion has not
been employed by the courts in establishment clause cases. To
do so would paralyze governmental action in the broad areas of
public health, welfare, safety, and morals. Legislation in these
fields in effect promotes Seeger-type ultimate values concerning
the public good, which may be deemed "religious."65
64. Under such an approach, even the atheist must be acknowledged as religious because he is supremely committed to the view that God does not exist.
The broadness of the test employed in Seeger can be explained by the strong
judicial belief that any free exercise definition of religion must be non-normative.
This rule was first enunciated in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), in
which the Court held that the first amendment forecloses judicial inquiry into the
truth or falsity of an asserted religious claim. The Ballard decision was buttressed in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), in which the Court said
that governmental discrimination among religions would abridge the establishment clause. Id. at 15. These decisions have thus far led the courts to posit that
sincerity of belief is the only criterion for determining a religion-based claim.
Otherwise, to impose upon an individual's or group's beliefs judicial or societal
conceptions of authentic religious beliefs would be an unconstitutional discrimination among religions.
This rule has not been consistently applied. For example, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court, on free exercise grounds, exempted members
of the Old Order Amish Church from state compulsory school-attendance laws.
The Court's holding appears to have been strongly influenced by the fact that the
Old Order Amish are a law-abiding and self-supporting religious community
whose way of life has continued unchanged and uninterrupted for over 200 years.
Moreover, in dictum, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, made a content-based distinction as to which beliefs are deserving of free exercise protection:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a
barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely
secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the
Thus, if the Amish asclaims must be rooted in religious belief .....
serted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of
the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as
Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at
Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's
choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.
Id. at 215-16. The validity of this proposition seems doubtful because the Chief
Justice ignores the fact that under the Seeger definition Thoreau's philosophical
views would be defined as religious and granted the same first amendment protection as the beliefs of the Old Order Amish.
65. See, e.g., P. KAuPER, RELIGION AND THE CoNsTrrTioN 92 (1964); Galanter,
Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217,
265-66; Hollingsworth, supra note 37, at 107-08; Manning, The Douglas Concept of
God in Government, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 47, 63-66 (1964); Van Alstyne, Constitutional
Separation of Church and State: The Quest for a Coherent Position, 57 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 865, 873-74 (1963).
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Religion and Public Education
Public education is an example of this establishment clause
paradox. One of the foremost aims of primary and secondary
schooling has been to inculcate societal values in children. 66 Values like self-sacrifice, scholastic achievement, and honesty have
been stressed in the schools along with civic and political values
necessary for the success of a democratic polity. However, under
the broad Seeger test the impartation of such values through the
educational process could be an establishment of religion because
these values express paramount concerns about the meaning and
purpose of life.67
To avoid striking down on constitutional grounds all valueladen educational subjects, the courts, without expressly stating
so, have adopted a narrow institutional approach to religion in the
educational sphere. The judiciary has prohibited on establishment grounds only practices associated with the dogmas, ceremonies, and liturgy of conventional religious institutions.68 Classroom activities and curricular subjects that inculcate ultimate values but are not associated with traditional religious belief and
practice have been left untouched by the courts. This is illustrated by an examination of some of the Supreme Court's major
establishment decisions dealing with public education.
In Engel v. Vitale69 the Supreme Court forbade the daily classroom recitation of a nondenominational prayer. Although participation was voluntary and the prayer was allegedly denominationally neutral, the Supreme Court held the practice unconstitutional because the prayer indoctrinated a theistic belief and
was closely associated with the tenets and rituals of orthodox religious groups. Similarly, one year after the Engel decision, the
Court held devotional Bible reading without comment in the
classroom to be unconstitutional in Abington School District v.
Schempp.o
66. See Note, Humanistic Values in the Public School Curriculum: Problemsin
Defining an Appropriate "Wall of Separation," 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 795 (1966).
67. See text accompanying notes 82-89 infra.
68. See Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution" A Classification
Problem, 11 VAL U.L REV. 163, 197-98 (1977); Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the
United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217, 265-68; Van Alstyne, Constitutional Separationof Church and State: The Questfor a Coherent Position,57 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 865, 873 (1963).
69. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
70. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

While striking down practices commonly associated with religion such as classroom prayer and devotional Bible reading, the
Supreme Court has approved other classroom practices equally
value-laden but divorced from conventional conceptions of religion. For example, the Engel Court expressly sanctioned the recitation by students of historical documents such as the
Declaration of Independence for their moral and spiritual significance. 7 1 Although these documents contain lofty quasi-religious
statements, the Court was apparently guided by the fact that such
viewpoints are held in common by most members of society and
72
are not associated with institutionalized religion per se.
The judicial employment of a different constitutional standard
in the establishment context is also demonstrated by decisions in
the lower courts. The prime example is Sheldon v. Fannin.73 In
Sheldon, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses were suspended
from school for refusing to stand during the singing of the National Anthem. The students challenged the suspension on both
free exercise and establishment grounds. The district court found
no establishment violation because it considered the Anthem of
patriotic and not of religious derivation. However, the court
agreed with the contention that coerced participation abridged
the students' free exercise rights. The court stated that a practice
could fail to contravene the establishment clause yet still abridge
free exercise rights, "[flor the former [establishment] looks to
the majority's concept of the term religion, the latter [free exercise to] the minority's."74
71. 370 U.S. at 435 n.21.
72. Also instructive is dictum in Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961), to the effect that legislation effectuating the general welfare and public morals does not contravene the establishment clause merely because it coincides with or is based on the tenets of some
religious sects. McGowan, however, was decided prior to the Supreme Court's
Seeger decision. Thus, the Chief Justice's statement does not adequately deal
with the problem raised in Seeger that any or all legislation effecting ultimate values may be defined as religious in and of itself whether or not the legislative purpose coincides with the tenets of organized religion.
This Engel dictum has also been relied on by at least one court in approving the
student recitation of historical documents containing references to the Deity as a
substitute for devotional Bible reading. Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 55-56
(W.D. Mich. 1965).
73. 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963).
74. Id. at 775. Two other cases, Wright v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 366 F.
Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), affd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974), and Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D.
Md. 1969), affd per curiam, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970),
are also illustrative. In both decisions establishment claims were summarily rejected by the court without reaching the problems posed by the application of the
broad Seeger definition of religion.
In Wright, school children sought to enjoin as a violation of both the establishment and the free exercise guaranties the teaching of the theory of evolution to
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Applicable case law demonstrates the lack of a clear judicial
standard by which to demarcate the scope of religion subsumed
by the first amendment. Cases involving free exercise claims
have generally used a broad, all-inclusive definition of religion.
However, when interpreting the establishment clause, the courts
have implicitly employed a narrow institutional definition of religion to save government programs from constitutional attack.
There is a present need for a consistent constitutional definition
of religion under both religion clauses of the first amendment.
This necessitates an approach that bridges the gap between the
functional and institutional definitions of religion yet solves the
dilemma when the broad functional definition is uniformly applied in the establishment context. The solution proposed by this
Comment is to use the broad functional definition for both religion clauses. However, to ensure that every government program
based on ultimate values is not subjected to establishment challenges, the functional definition should be applied only when the
policies served by the establishment clause are at stake.
the exclusion of other theories about Man's origins. The establishment claim was
based on the argument that by uncritically teaching only the theory of evolution,
the school district was establishing a religion of secularism. Nevertheless the
court held the plaintiffs' claim to be frivolous. Although the court conceded the
theory of evolution conflicted with the dogmas of many religious groups, plaintiffs
had shown no demonstrable "connection between 'religion,' as employed in the
first amendment, and Defendants' approach to the subject of evolution." Wright v.
Houston Ind. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. at 1210. Rather, the court found the theory
"peripheral to the matter of religion." Id. at 1211. As an indicium of the doctrinal
confusion reigning in the establishment area, the court supported this proposition
by citing the narrow theistic definition of religion in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890). Wright v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. at 1210 n.5. The liberal
Seeger definition was not mentioned by the court. However, it is possible that the
theory of evolution could be considered religious according to the Seeger test if it
were taught as the sole explanation of Man's origins. It would thus be competing
against other, supernatural explanations of the origin and purpose of the human
species. See Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools,
87 YALE L.J. 515 (1978) (strong criticism of the Wright decision).
Almost identical establishment and free exercise arguments were similarly dismissed by the court in Cornwell. Plaintiffs challenged a Maryland State Board of
Education bylaw requiring sex education courses in public elementary and secondary schools. The Cornwell court found plaintiffs' constitutional claims unpersuasive. Rather, the court examined the courses and found they did not "establish
any particular religious dogma or precept." Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F.
Supp. 340, 344 (D. Md. 1969), afDd per curiam, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 942 (1970).

ELEMENTS OF AN ESTABLISHMENT DEFINITION

The Proposed Definition
The proposed definition accepts the functional criteria set forth
in Seeger as the fundamental basis of a proper establishment definition of religion. Religion is defined broadly: Religious beliefs
are beliefs or values that serve as the objects of the individual's
supreme life commitments 75 and upon which all else is ultimately
dependent.7 6 To retain flexibility and to accommodate structural
and theological changes in the growth of modern religious movements, the proposed definition of religion dispenses with theism
and ritualism as necessary components of religious belief and
practice. Moreover, religion is given the same meaning pursuant
to both religion clauses of the first amendment.
An establishment definition should be greater in breadth than
the narrow and inconsistent institutional approach implicitly
adopted by the courts in establishment cases. When invoked by
the establishment clause, the term religion should be understood
to include its traditional manifestations, such as prayer and devotional Bible-reading, which prior decisions have already held to
be unconstitutional. Furthermore, religion should also be given a
meaning flexible enough to prevent government aid to modern religious or quasi-religious movements that do not fit into traditional religious categories.
A theistic or institutional definition of religion is too constricted
to carry out the broad purposes of non-establishment in a changing society. When establishment is at issue, there is no logical
reason why a religion must adhere to theism or evidence a concern with the supernatural. Nor should a religion necessarily engage in activities traditionally denoted as religious.
Furthermore, if theism and supernaturalism are held to be essential components of religion, constitutional discrimination may
occur. Established religions evidencing a belief in the supernatural, embodied in theological dogma and cultic practice, would be
foreclosed from government support. However, contemporary
and nonconventional movements that use a relatively secular approach and emphasize the solving of Mankind's problems in the
here and now would be completely free of any establishment limitation. Under such a narrow approach, Roman Catholicism, with
its time-worn traditions and supernatural theology, would be
found religious whereas Secular Humanists, who evidence a disdain for the transcendental, would not be considered religious.
75. Holingsworth, supra note 37, at 30.
76. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
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Application of the Proposed Definition in Establishment Cases
The proposed definition of religion should be applied by the
courts only when significant establishment clause values are at
stake because the consistent judicial application of the all-inclusive functional definition in the establishment context could place
in constitutional jeopardy all governmentally sponsored programs
evidencing Seeger-type ultimate values. Such a result is not feasible and is politically undesirable. However, this paradox can be
avoided by recognizing the different policies served by each of the
Constitution's religion clauses and limiting the proposed definition to circumstances in which establishment policies are violated.
The free exercise clause primarily protects matters of individual conscience from state interference.7 7 The scope of the clause
is closely allied with and aided by the assembly, speech, and
press guarantees of the first amendment.1 8 For these reasons, the
courts have defined religion in a functional and content-free manner in the free exercise area. This definition prevents probing by
the judiciary or other organs of government into matters of conscience and forecloses governmental discrimination against unconventional and unpopular groups. This result also furthers
religious diversity and the development of all types of belief and
expression protected in general by the other provisions of the first
amendment. Thus, when free exercise is at issue, the courts will
usually confer liberally the protection of the clause to all claimants as long as their asserted religious beliefs are sincerely held.
Different values govern the establishment clause. Courts and
commentators have stated that the non-establishment guaranty
furthers two goals: the precluding of civil strife among organized
religious factions competing for government benefits, 79 and the
77. See the Court's statement in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963): "IT]he Free Exercise Clause ... recognizes the value of religious
training, teaching and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person
to freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion
from the state." See also Van Alstyne, Constitutional Separation of Church and
State: The Questfor a Coherent Position, 57 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 865, 874 (1963).
78. Manning, The Douglas Concept of God in Government, 39 WASH. L. REv. 47,
66-67 (1964).
79. See, e.g., the Court's statement in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 274
U.S. 203, 222 (1963):
The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus stems
from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or

safeguarding of individual religious liberty.80 The establishment
clause advances freedom of religion by forestalling the religious
discrimination, persecution, and coercion that inevitably occur
whenever the state throws its support behind favored religious
groups or tries to inculcate an official religious orthodoxy. 81
When free exercise is at issue, the courts must accept the bona
fide religious claim of each individual. However, courts dealing
with establishment should be guided by the general political and
social values served by the establishment clause. These values go
beyond the protection of individual rights guaranteed by the free
exercise clause into broader questions as to the proper scope of
government activity in the religious and private spheres. Thus,
when assessing establishment claims, the courts need not accept
every assertion that a government activity is religiously based but
should further examine whether the activity contravenes the underlying values of the establishment clause.
groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions
or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official
support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the
tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.
Similarly, in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962), the majority noted that the
Framers of the first amendment intended to avoid "the anguish, hardship and bitter strife that could come when zealous religious groups struggled with one another to obtain the Government's stamp of approval." See also Van Alstyne,
ConstitthionalSeparationof Church and State: The Questfor a Coherent Position,
57 Am. POL SCL REv. 865, 868 (1963).
80. "Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness
of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962). See also P.
KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTrrUnON 13 (1964); Galanter, Religious Freedoms
in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L REv. 217, 221; Katz, Religious
Studies in State Universities, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 297, 298. The two principles are
closely interrelated. Prevention of religious competition for government support
effectuates religious liberty. Thus the establishment clause and the free exercise
clause partially overlap; both protect religious freedom. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at
430.
81. The danger of coercion, for example, strongly influenced the Supreme
Court's decisions on released-time programs, prayer, and devotional Bible-reading
in the public schools. Although the establishment clause may overlap in purpose
with the free exercise guaranty, violation of the former will usually have a more
drastic effect than violation of the latter. Most often, an establishment clause violation will result in a complete prohibition of the questioned government activity.
However, a finding that free exercise rights have been abridged will often cause
the complaining individual only to be exempted from the government regulation
or activity. This exemption was illustrated in Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766
(D. Ariz. 1963). If the Sheldon court had found an establishment violation, it
would have had to enjoin the playing of the National Anthem in school exercises.
By finding only an abridgement of the Jehovah's Witnesses' free exercise rights,
the court was able to save the patriotic ceremony and merely exempt the plaintiffs
from coerced participation. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(Amish children exempted from compulsory school-attendance statute).
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The ProposedEstablishment Test
The proposed test seeks to limit pragmatically the functional
definition of religion in the establishment arena by narrowing its
application to contexts in which underlying establishment values
are at stake. A two-prong test is used. To offend the establishment clause, a challenged state practice must serve a functionally
religious purpose and must contravene either prong of the test.
Under the test, the establishment guaranty is invoked when:
(1) government extends aid to groups or organizations primarily espousing a belief or beliefs concerning ultimate values; or
(2) governmental action results in the inculcation in individuals of ultimate values not consensually shared by the vast majority of society's members.
The first prong of the proposed test serves the establishment
principle of eliminating the destructive civil strife engendered
when religious organizations vie for state assistance. If the principal tenets of a group or organization attempt to supply answers to
ultimate questions about Man's purpose and being, thereby forming the supreme life commitment of its adherents, the criteria of
the functional definition are met. 82 Moreover, the establishment
clause would be violated if the government extended aid in any
form to such a group or organization. However, whether a group
addressed itself to obedience to God's will, pursuit of universal
human brotherhood, or a devotion to the inherent goodness of all
men would have no bearing under the proposed test. Government support of each group would be unconstitutional as long as
the group's adherents held these beliefs to be of supreme importance.
82. Determining whether such beliefs touch ultimate values would be the
most difficult problem encountered by the courts under the proposed definition.
However, it should not be too difficult to distinguish, for example, between the
NAACP, whose programs are based on ultimate values concerning the inherent
equality of the races, and TM/SCI, which claims to hold the panacea to all of society's problems. All groups engaged in social and political action may be expressing some types of ultimate values. Ideals concerning the equality of all men, the
moral injustice of war, or the immorality of abortion, for example, are based to

some extent on ultimate values about Man's nature and purpose. The distinction,
however, between political and social groups and religious organizations is one of
degree. One must look to whether the questioned group attempts to provide allinclusive answers to ultimate questions and to whether such beliefs command an
exclusive loyalty or faith from the group's adherents. See Ladd, Public Education
and Religion, 13 J. PuB. L. 310, 324 (1964).

The first prong solves the dilemma that arises when the broad
functional definition is uniformly applied in the establishment
context. Governmental programs and policies that actualize such
ultimate values are safe from constitutional challenge under the
test. Only when their primary purpose and effect would be to
confer a direct benefit on a functionally religious organization
would the establishment prohibition come into play. Thus, under
the proposed test, government could legislate broadly in the area
of public welfare without establishment limitation.
The second prong of the proposed test is intended to further the
free exercise rights of individuals by protecting them from indoctrination through the agencies of government in a manner contrary to their religious beliefs. This prong comes into play
primarily with the extremely troublesome and complex constitutional issues posed by religious teaching, ceremony, and value inculcation in the realm of public elementary and secondary
education. A great deal of the case law on establishment has
cropped up in the educational field, largely because school-age
children, emotionally immature and with unsettled internal value
structures, are uniquely susceptible to religious indoctrination by
their peers and by adult authority figures.83 This susceptibility is
magnified by the compulsory nature of public education. Occupy83. For example, speaking of the inherent coercion involved in released-time
programs, Justice Frankfurter perceptively stated that in such programs "It]he
law of imitation operates, and nonconformity is not an outstanding characteristic
of children. The result is an obvious pressure upon children to attend." Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concur-

ring).
Professor Choper finds freedom from coercion to be the main establishment
value served in the educational setting. Under his proposed standard, the establishment clause would prohibit "solely religious activity that is likely to result in
(1) compromising the student's religious or conscientious beliefs or (2)
influencing the student's freedom of religious or conscientious choice." Choper,
Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard,47 MINN. L.
REV. 329, 330 (1963) (emphasis original). The problem of indoctrination in the
schools has also received extensive academic comment. See Arons, The Separation of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HAnv. EDUC. REV. 76, 96-99
(1976); Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966
WIs. L. REV. 217, 222; Hirschoff, Parentsand the Public School Curriculum:Is There
a Right to Have One's Child Excused From Objectionable Instruction?,50 S. CAL.
L. REV. 871, 905-09 (1977); Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in
Public Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515, 532-36 (1978). See generally Dreeben, The Contribution of Schooling to the Learning of Norms, 37 HARv. EDUC. REV. 211 (1967).
The problem of religious indoctrination does not usually arise in institutions of
higher education. Ideally, the college or university student should be exposed to a
variety of competing scientific, philosophical, and religious viewpoints in the academic search for Truth. Also, issues of academic freedom are more likely to arise
in the setting of higher education than in the primary and secondary schools. For
general discussion see Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development. PartII. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513,
581-82 (1968); Katz, Religious Studies in State Universities,1966 Wis. L. REV. 297;
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ing five to eight hours of the child's day, school can exert a strong
influence on personality and value-formation.
Permissible Values in the Educational Curriculum
If a functional definition of religion were uniformly applied in
the educational context, the establishment clause would be violated whenever teachers or other school personnel, through either
curricular content or teaching methodology, attempted to inculcate ultimate values in students. 84 Such a result, however, would
run counter to the realities of public education in the United
States. If the broad functional definition were to be used in the
educational sphere, classroom inculcation of democratic values,
such as free speech, equality, justice, and majority rule, and
moral values, such as honesty, personal integrity, and self-discipline, could be barred as unconstitutional. The result would be a
sterile educational environment marked by moral relativism.
Moreover, both educators and the Supreme Court have stated
that value inculcation is a permissible, and even a necessary,
85
function of public education.
Practical considerations dictate a differentiation between ultimate values that society deems necessary to impart through the
educational process and values that if inculcated through the curLouisell & Jackson, Religion, Theology, and Public Higher Education, 50 CALIF. L.
REV. 751 (1962).
84. The establishment clause would be triggered only when such values were
discussed in an unneutral manner. The Court expressly authorized objective
study of the Bible and of religion in general in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). Whether complete objectivity can be achieved in teaching
value-laden subjects is questionable. See Axons, The Separation of School and
State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARV. EDUc. REV. 76, 96-99 (1976) (schooling is inherently a value-inculcating process).
85. It is implicit in the history and character of American public education
that the public schools serve a uniquely public function: the training of
American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort-an atmosphere in which children may assimiThis is
late a heritage common to all American groups and religions....
a heritage neither theistic nor atheistic, but simply civic and patriotic.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis original) (citation omitted). Emphasis on the teaching of moral
and spiritual values was advocated by the National Educational Association. EDUCATIONAL POLICIES COMM'N, MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(1951). See also Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School
Teachers to Deter7nine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1350 (1976) (The
historically accepted view has been that value inculcation is a major function of
public education).

riculum would offend establishment norms. 86 A solution would be
to permit the inculcation of potentially functionally religious val-

ues that are consensually shared by society in general and that
are essential to effective participation in a democracy. 87 Schools

could then permissibly teach that lying, cheating, and stealing are
morally wrong as well as offically encourage the adoption of dem-

ocratic precepts by students,'as these values are unquestioned by
the public. 88
However, when controversial viewpoints are raised in the classroom, as they inevitably are, the Constitution mandates that they
be dealt with in as completely objective a manner as possible.
This mandate ensures the balanced presentation of all shades of
opinion on the subject, thus allowing the pupil to decide which
86. One writer has urged that the only constitutionally effective way to prevent value-inculcation of children in a manner contrary to the desires of their parents is through the institution of an educational voucher system: Each family
would be granted funds by the government to pay for the education of its children
in the private school of its choice. Axons, The Separation of School and State:
Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARv. EDUC. REV. 76 (1976). It is doubtful, however, that
contemporary American society is ready to dismantle its system of public education in the interest of promoting cultural pluralism. The American public school
system has been a strong influence in creating a relatively culturally homogenous
society from a group of diverse peoples. One may thus question the amount of social pluralism that can be tolerated in a democratic society without sacrificing the
national unity necessary to the functioning of a strong polity. For a critique of private sectarian schools on these grounds, see Dixon, Religion, Schools, and the
Open Society: A Socio-ConstitutionalIssue, 13 J. PuB. L. 267, 306-07 (1964).
87. The teaching of these "core" cultural values is advocated in Hall, Morality
and Religion in Public Schools: A Dialogue, 72 RELIGIOUS EDUC. 273, 279 (1977):
What is needed at present, therefore, is the development of a strong "public" approach to education centered upon and embodying the central core
values of our society, and dealing with these values in an authentically
secular way, i.e. accepting them as values widely held by people in our society but treating them with neutrality as regards their possible religious
foundations.
See also Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in McCollum, in which he discusses
the impossibility and undesirability of removing all religious influences from the
curriculum:
[Ilt would not seem practical to teach either practice or appreciation of
the arts if we are to forbid exposure of youth to any religious influences.
Music ithout sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral, or painting
without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and incomplete, even
from a secular point of view. Yet the inspirational appeal of religion in
these guises is often stronger than in forthright sermon. Even such a "science" as biology raises the issue between evolution and creation as an exThe fact is that, for good or
planation of our presence on this planet ....
for ill, nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting, everything
which gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious influences ....
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1948).
88. However, the ultimate source of these values may be a point of contention.
For example, it would be impermissible for an instructor to teach that stealing is
wrong because it violates the imperative of the Ten Commandments or of the
Hindu law of Karma.
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view to adopt.89
APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED DEFINITION OF RELIGION AND TwoPRONG ANALYSIS TO THE NEW JERSEY TM/SCI COURSES

Applying the proposed functional definition of religion and twoprong establishment test to the Malnak facts, it is apparent that
the New Jersey TM/SCI courses offend the establishment clause.
The criteria of the functional definition are met because the
course textbook posits a system of functionally religious beliefsthe main tenet being that practice of TM allows one to contact the
ultimate and constituent source of everything in the universe and
that practice of the technique is the only method by which to obtain self-actualization.
Both components of the proposed two-part test are also violated.90 TM/SCI is primarily propagated through several interre89. A good example is the issue of abortion. The question lends itself to controversy and has led to ideological polarization among some segments of society.
Furthermore, convictions about the morality of abortion are dependent on beliefs
touching ultimate values concerning the nature and beginning of human life.
Thus, under the proposed standard, the Constitution would prohibit an instructor
from advocating in the classroom either the propriety or the impropriety of the
practice.
In further protection of free exercise rights, parents of minority persuasions
should also have the right to excuse their children from classes or from activities
that might compromise their beliefs. Such a remedy is imperfect. For example,
many parents may be unaware that their children are being taught in a manner
contrary to their own values. Also, peer pressure on minority children to conform
may be heavy, resulting in the imposition of a social stigma if exemption from participation is granted. However, the compromise may be the only workable remedy
available. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish children exempted
from compulsory education statute on free exercise ground); West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (first amendment prevents Jehovah's
Witness children from being compelled to salute the flag). See also Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum:Is There a Right to Have One's Child Excused From Objectionable Instruction?,50 S. CAL. L. REV. 871 (1977).
90. The proposed definition of religion and establishment test are not meant
as substitutes for the three-prong Nyquist analysis currently employed by the'
Supreme Court. Rather, the proposed definition of religion and establishment test
are intended to be limited in application to situations in which the religiousness of
the state activity is at issue. When the religiousness of the activity is unquestioned, as in the case of classroom prayer, the use of the analysis developed in this
Comment is unnecessary. In such instances, not only would the criteria of the
functional definition be met, but prong one of the establishment test would automatically be violated because such unquestionably religious activity always results in the aggrandizement of some institutionalized religious interests (e.g.,
classroom prayer is an indirect form of aid to those organized religions holding
theistic beliefs).
Moreover, once it is found that the criteria of the proposed definition of religion

lated organizational structures, all under the control of the
movement's founder, the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. 91 A principal
goal of these organizations is to secure a commitment among TM
practitioners to the religious beliefs set forth in the course textbook.
Moreover, by introducing TM/SCI courses into the curriculum,
the state was directly aiding in the furtherance of TM/SCI's organizational goals to the detriment of other organized religious
groups. Thus, the first prong is violated.
The second prong is contravened because the TM/SCI instruction infringed on the right of students not to be indoctrinated with
a system of ultimate values. The instruction first accomplished
this infringement through the biased presentation contained in
the course textbook. The text posited as objective fact a pseudoscientific theory purportedly explaining the structure of the universe and the ultimate goals of mankind. Second, the compulsory
initiation puja ceremony compromised students' religious beliefs
by coercing them unwittingly to participate in a ceremony in
which a deceased guru was worshipped as a divine being.92
Moreover, the theories expounded in the textbook and the worship present in the puja ceremony are not the types of practices
and beliefs comprising the core values of the American cultural
tradition. Rather, they are practices and beliefs that a substantial
number of society's members would find personally objectionable.
The establishment clause is meant to guard against the indoctrination of students in such beliefs under the guise of govern93

ment.

and establishment test are met, the Nyquist test must still be applied to determine the ultimate constitutionality of the challenged activity. Under the Nyquist
test, for example, government action must show a primary or principal effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion to avoid the establishment prohibition. Government aid to a religious or quasi-religious organization may thus be found to offend establishment principles under the analysis developed in this Comment yet
not violate the Nyquist test if the government aids the organization only remotely
or indirectly. The government activity would not then evidence a primary or
principal effect that advances religion.
91. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
92. See text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.
93. The conclusion drawn here that the introduction of TM/SCI courses into
the public schools infringes on the establishment clause raises the question of
which other aspects of the educational curriculum may equally run afoul of the
first amendment under the proposed definition of religion. A possibility, by way of
example, is values clarification, a widely instituted program in the field of moral
education that has become increasingly controversial. Primarily expounded by
educator Sidney B. Simon, values clarification uses a variety of classroom exercises to focus on the process of valuing (ie., the process of choosing and internalizing values). The underlying principle is a utilitarian, empirical approach to
valuation which suggests that the content of one's values is not as important as
that they are chosen freely, considered valuable to the individual, and are person-
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CONCLUSION

Courts during the last four decades have moved from the application of a traditional, theistic definition of religion in assessing
free exercise of religion claims toward a definition that is all-inclusive and content-free. This growth is in keeping with many
strands of modern religious thought and reflects a judicial desire
to avoid discriminating against free exercise claimants on the basis of the content of their beliefs. However, literal judicial employment of such an open-ended definition in the establishment
clause context leads to severe theoretical problems and the possible constitutional endangerment of a wide variety of government
programs evidencing broadly defined "religious" values.
However, courts considering establishment challenges to government action have implicitly used a narrower definition of religion than that employed in giving content to the meaning of
religion *forfree exercise clause purposes. This was aptly illustrated in the Malnak case, in which the court held Transcendental Meditation to be a religion within the parameters of the
establishment clause without clearly enunciating the standards it
employed in reaching its decision.
It is hoped that the definition of religion and establishment test
developed in this Comment will aid in the identification of the issues at stake when religion is defined in the establishment area
and will provide the basis for a consistent and workable approach
ally desired. See L. RAms, M. HARnM, & S. SIMoN, VALUES AND TEACHING (1966);
S. SIMON, L. HOWE, & H. KIIRSCHENBAUm, VALUES CLARIFICATION: A HANDBOOK OF

PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR TEACHERS AND STUDENTS (1972). Values clarification
has thus been criticized because of its alleged moral relativism and subtle bias toward the Deweyan rational-empirical philosophical system. Adell, Values Clarification Revised, 93 CHImSTIAN CENTURY 436 (1976); Fiske, "Values Education" in
Schools and Churches, 34 THEOLOGY TODAY 92, 92-94 (1977). See also Aron, Moral
Philosophy and Moral Education:A Critique of Kohlberg's Theory, 85 ScH. REV.
197 (1977) (critique of moral educator Lawrence Kohlberg's theories on the ground
they are biased toward a specific moral-philosophical viewpoint).
One may thus question whether such a program may be held religious under
the second prong of the proposed test by indoctrinating students with the position
that any moral value is morally defensible if freely chosen, highly prized, etc. This
viewpoint may conflict with many religious beliefs that the validity of moral values
is determined by super-rational sources, either church tradition or holy scripture.
Therefore, under the proposed definition of religion, concerned parents may be
able to bring suit either to exclude their children from the program or to have the
program proscribed from the classroom.

that will advance the values served by the establishment clause
of the first amendment.
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